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Introduction
Film is a motion picture whose script was written by 
Samuel Beckett, and directed by Alan Schneider.  The 
theme is from George Berkeley's dictum, “ Esse est 
percipi, ” which means “being is perceived. ”
 If “ being is perceived, ” the world outside the 
“ perception ” would be a state of “ non-being. ” Is it 
possible?  Beckett's Film tries to pursue this problem.
 In this Film, a man (who is called “Object ” in the 
script, and played by Buster Keaton) tries to flee from 
the perception and reach a state of non-being; however, 
he fails in the end, because he cannot evade perceiving 
himself.
 This “ alter ego ” type of motif seems common, 
especially in modern literature; it is taken in many 
different works, such as Edgar Alan Poe's The Crowd. 
In this short novel, the protagonist sees a mysterious 
man, and follows him all through the night in London; 
finally, he discovers the man is himself; the protagonist 
who has been watching the man proves to be the man 
himself. In other words, the perceiving subject is the 
perceived object at the same time.
 The similar motif is also frequent in Beckett's 
works. For example, in a later play, A Piece of 
Monologue, a man on stage talks about himself in both 
the first and the third person narrative. He is a talking 
subject, and at the same time, he is the object that his 
talk focuses on.
 Although this seemingly common motif  in 
Beckett's novel and play has been studied in various 
ways so far, it is not deeply analyzed concerning Film. 
Therefore, in this paper, I will describe how this motif 
is expressed, and in what sense, by focusing on the last 
scene of the film, in which the pursuing camera proves 
to be the man's alter ego. It will be described from 
three different perspectives:
(1) In the last scene where the perceiving subject is 
found the perceived object, what is Beckett trying to 
express?
(2) How is the last scene of Film related with film as 
a media genre?  Is there any quality in film that other 
media do not have when dealing with the “ alter ego ” 
motif?
(3) With what method and by what kind of person 
should the motif be embodied?
The following sections 1 and 2 will give an answer to 
(1), and the section 3, (2). The section 4 will describe 
about (3).
1. Reality as a Criticism of Realism
In ordinary experiences, people are not confused about 
the difference between the act of perceiving and the 
perceived object. They keep switching their position 
between them. If so, when those two are integrated, is 
it not an ordinary experience?
  　We may be able to refer to Kantian philosophy, 
which makes a difference between the transcendental 
subject and the empirical one, but here instead, 
Beckett's own idea about the integration of subject and 
object must be followed. 
 In  h i s  “ Prous t , ”  Becket t  ta lks  about  the 
identification between the present experience and the 
past one. In everyday life, people differentiate their 
subjectivity from the objective life world, as Beckett 
describes: 
…there is not “ any direct and purely experimental 
contact possible between subject and object, because 
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they are automatically separated by the subject's 
consciousness of perception, and the object loses its 
purity and becomes a mere intellectual pretext or 
motive (Proust 74).
To the contrary, when action and reaction in the past 
are represented in the present, the difference between 
the two disappears because of their cooperation. At 
that moment, according to Beckett, the “ essential 
reality ” is liberated:
The identification of immediate with past experience, 
the recurrence of past action or reaction in the present, 
amounts to a participation between the ideal and the 
real, imagination and direct apprehension, symbol and 
substance. Such participation frees the essential reality. 
(74)
The “ essential reality ” does not appear under our 
usual perception, in which past and present, the ideal 
and the real, are separated. Such perception must be 
“ disarmed ” in order to make the “ essential reality ” 
appear. This “ essential reality ” emerges in Film, 
because in the very last scene, Beckett tries to disarm 
the perception and identify subject (the perceiver, or 
the camera) and object (the perceived, or Keaton). 
Figure 1. The eye in the last scene of Film
 In the last scene, the image of an eye is the last 
shot (Figure 1). The audience cannot tell whether it is 
the perceiver's eye or the perceived one's. This last shot 
suggests the identification, the essential reality being 
revealed. The eye in this shot seems not related with 
the general perceptive faculty of human being because 
there is no object that the eye can see. However, the 
man does not completely evade perception itself, 
because the eye has a potentiality of perception, which 
would start working in another way.
 Concerning the relationship of perception with the 
“ reality ” Beckett describes, by referring to Baudlaire:
 And he (Proust) understands the meaning of 
Baudlaire's definition of reality as ‘ the adequate union 
of subject and object ’, and more clearly than ever the 
grotesque fallacy of a realistic art― ‘ the miserable 
statement of line and surface ’, and the penny-a-line 
vulgarity of a literature of notations. (76)
Here, it is clear that Beckett criticizes realism in art and 
literature. Realism distorts the objective world through 
the prejudiced, subjective perception.
2. Close-up and the “ Affection-image ”
Self-perception, which is the main theme of Film, is 
impossible to experience directly, or immediately. We 
can perceive ourselves only when using such media 
as a mirror and a camera. These media can be tools of 
imitation, so they tend to create an image of “ realism. ” 
In this sense, Film denies “ realism” which distorts the 
objective world by imitating things, and it pursues the 
“essential reality. ”
 Gilles Deleuze describes the identification between 
subject and object in Film as “ affection-image ” in his 
Cinema. Deleuze's ideas help us interpret Beckett's Film 
from the perspective of film theory.
 Deleuze refers to Henri Bergson's Matter and 
Memory, and creates two notions: movement-image 
and time-image. He divides the movement-image into 
three categories: perception-image, action-image, 
and affection-image. Deleuze sees a world as the 
accumulation of such images: in his view, image is not a 
delusion but a matter created by optical particles. It is 
not idea but substance. In this accumulation of images 
particles appear and disappear; they are organized and 
disorganized themselves. This process is what Deleuze 
calls the movement-image. 
 The perception-image is an act of human being, 
in which they try to be engaged in such an image-
accumulated world. The perception image makes 
the world transform, and the world also influences 
the perception itself. Deleuze calls this process an 
“ incurvation” of the world.
130 富山大学芸術文化学部紀要　第3巻　平成21年2月G E I B U N 0 0 3 :
 The action-image is the relationship between 
human behavior and environment. Human behavior 
influences their situation, and vice versa. In film, the 
action image is expressed in the coordinate of fixed 
time and space. 
 The affection-image is positioned in the interval 
between the perception image and the action image. 
It appears without the coordinate of time and space. 
As an example, Deleuze takes a close-up shot of a face. 
The close-up face is not related with an individual 
personality. It is a surface. However, it is not an 
indifferent, empty phenomenon, either. 
 
 Affects are not individuated like people and things, 
but nevertheless they do not blend into the indifference 
of the world. They have singularities which enter 
into virtual conjunction and each time constitute a 
complex entity. It is like points of melting, of boiling, 
of condensation, of coagulation, etc. This is why faces 
which express various affects, or the various points of 
the same affect, do not merge into a single fear which 
would obliterate them (obliterating fear is merely a 
limit-case). (Cinema 1 103)
 If a close-up face is a typical expression of 
“ affection, ” as Deleuze says, the close-up shot of 
Buster Keaton in the last scene of Film is its perfect 
example.  
 Naturally, Deleuze considers that Beckett's Film 
embodies his own taxonomy. According to Deleuze, 
the street and stairs scenes correspond to an action-
image (Figures 2-3). The room scene corresponds to 
a perception-image, in which the man tries to hide 
from the eyes of animals or pictures (Figure 4). The 
last scene corresponds to an affection-image, in which 
the man is duplicated by switching the camera, or the 
subject and the object are overlapped. 
 The character O is thus now seen from the 
front,[…] the camera OE is the double of O, the same 
face, a patch over one eye (monocular vision), with the 
single difference that O has an anguished expression 
and OE has an attentive expression: the impotent motor 
effort of the one, the sensitive surface of the other. We 
are in the domain of the perception of affection, the 
most terrifying, that which still survives when all the 
others have been destroyed: it is the perception of self 
by self, affection-image. (67-68) 
Figure 2. The man going along the street
Figure 3. The stairs
Figure 4. The man is trying to get the cat out of the room.
Affection is a kind of uncertainty where perception 
does not work and any action does not come out 
yet (98). It is very similar to Beckett's notion of the 
“ essential reality ” in which the usual perception of 
subject becomes impossible. 
 According to the script, the theme of Film is “ the 
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anguish of being perceived. ” It might be possible to 
say that the last scene, which Deleuze calls affection, 
is the ultimate form of its anguish. This anguish 
probably comes from an uncomfortable feeling people 
have when they find themselves not only perceiving 
something but also being perceived. Beckett's script 
describes: “All persons in opening scene to be shown 
in some way perceiving – one another, an object, a shop 
window, a poster, etc., i.e., all contentedly in percipere 
and percipi ” (Beckett Film 12). This scene is edited in 
the film, but it implies that all the scenes are aiming 
at the last one, in which the “ contented ” perception 
breaks down and the ultimate anguish appears.
 The “ anguish ” theme reminds us of Henri 
Bergson's Matter and Memory. Bergson asks in this book 
how affection comes from perception, and he takes 
anguish, or pain, as an example. “ Every pain, then, 
must consist in an effort, -- an effort which is doomed 
to be unavailing. Every pain is a local effort, and in its 
very isolation lies the cause of its impotence ” (56). 
Organism is struggling to erase the stimulation coming 
from the outside; however, our organic body sometimes 
cannot erase it but absorb it. Bergson sees the cause 
of affection in such a state of organic body which fails 
in rejecting the stimulation. In that sense, the affection 
in Film appears when the organic circulation of the 
perceiving - perceived relationship is broken by the 
camera. 
 Bergson says, “Suppose the distance [between our 
perception of an object and our body] reduced to zero, 
that is to say that the object to be perceived coincides 
with our body, that is to say again, that our body is 
the object to be perceived. Then it is no longer virtual 
action, but real action, that this specialized perception 
will express: and this is exactly what affection is ” (58). 
This statement is exactly true of the last scene of Film.
 Thus, what Beckett tried to express in that scene 
is, in his own term, the “ essential reality ” ; according 
to Deleuze's concept, it is the “affection-image, ” which 
is originated in Bergsonian “pain” or “ real action. ” 
3. Film as a mode expressing the “ identification ” 
motif
The identification between subject (the perceiver) and 
object (the perceived) is not uncommon in Beckett's 
works, nor is his objection to “ realism. ” His novels, 
plays, or radio plays take such motif and method more 
or less. Then, does film as a mode of expression make 
any difference from other genres when expressing the 
motif of the subject-object identification and going 
against “ realism” ?
 In film, there may be two features that other 
genres do not have. First, in film, close-up shots can 
focus on one's facial expression. In that sense, it is 
easier for film to express what Deleuze calls “affection” 
than other genres.
 Second, in film, two types of “ eyes, ” a character's 
and a camera's, are functioning; sometimes they are 
distanced, and sometimes they are overlapped. While 
in novels the narrator's narrative tend to unify the 
different perspectives of characters (and in plays 
a person would do the same thing), in film, plural 
perspectives tend to be disclosed. This indicates 
that film is appropriate for expressing the “ essential 
reality ” or “ affection ” caused by the duality of the 
subject's and the object's eyes.
3.1 Close-up Face
A film theorist Béla Balázs describes a close-up method 
as follows: human face has a combination of “destiny” 
and “ soul, ” type and personality, the native and the 
acquired, fate and will, Es and Ich, and they are fighting 
against each other on the face. The profound secret of 
his/her internal life would appear on it.
 Face has not only an outside feature but also an 
internal feeling on it. That is why, Balázs says, the 
motif of the alter ego leads to a true “ reality ” when it 
is expressed in film. In film, through visual images, the 
audience can see one's plural “ selves ” reflecting their 
different feelings on his / her face.  
 Balázs's theory would support Beckett's idea 
“ essential reality ” and Deleuze's notion “ affection-
image. ” Film can visualize self and other at the same 
time. Balázs points out that film shares one of depth 
psychology's themes: how one can be oneself, as well 
as the other. This is very similar to Film's motif: how 
one can be seen by oneself, as well as the other.
 According to  Balázs ,  fac ia l  express ion is 
polyphonic. One's various inner feelings emerge on 
face at one time. A close-up face in film expresses 
those feelings, or affection. In novels, words have to 
treat characters ’ feelings one by one, so they need 
consecutiveness rather than simultaneity. In plays, face 
cannot be seen close-up, so feelings expressed on it 
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are hard to reach the audience without words or body 
movement. In this sense, film is more appropriate than 
other media to express the motif of the identification 
between the perceiver and the perceived. The plural 
aspects on a close-up of a face make it possible to 
describe the struggle between the perceiver and the 
perceived, or subject and object. 
3.2 Distanced Eyes
The audience is used to filling the gap between a 
camera's eye and a character's point of view; watching 
a screen, they switch their perspectives one after the 
other and apply them to the world within it. In other 
words, the audience is conditioned to see things in 
the “ realist ” perspective or adjust themselves to the 
“ realist ” frame of reference. 
 As described above, Beckett suggested that in 
Proust there is an anti-realist point of view, and such 
a view is embodied in Beckett's own works. In order to 
take an anti-realist view, a seamless perspective must 
be broken in some way. In Film, Beckett tried to break it 
in the last scene by overlapping the camera eye and the 
protagonist's. The audience is forced to be conscious 
of the existence of the camera from the opening scene, 
and they keep feeling the distance between the camera 
eye and the protagonist's all through the film. 
 Is this kind of experience unusual in cinema 
history? Of course not. We can keep track of the 
genealogy of works which take an anti-realist view and 
make the audience conscious of the camera eye, such 
as Dziga Vertov's The Man with a Movie Camera.*2
 One good example is Jean-Luc Godard's 2 ou 3 
choses que je sais d'elle, although it does not exactly 
take an alter-ego motif; the main character is both a 
housewife and a fancy woman. She plays two social 
roles. Playing several roles in a society is not strange, 
but in this movie, it becomes more complicated because 
the movie reveals in the opening scene the fact that an 
actress plays the role of the housewife. After that, the 
audience cannot help being conscious of the distance 
between the character and the actress herself. They 
cannot identify themselves with the woman either, 
because they would hesitate to choose which one they 
are going for, the housewife, the fancy lady, or the 
actress. *3 
 Beckett's Film also belongs to this type of camera-
conscious works. Repeatedly, in Film, the camera eye 
and the main character's eyes express the doubled 
perspectives of the same man. 
 Technically, in Film, when the camera functions 
as the man's view, the lens is filtered. When the 
camera functions as a camera (which later proves to 
be the man's other self's eye), the filter is revealed. 
Even in the last scene where the perceiving camera 
and the perceived man are being identified, the 
distance between them is kept by changing their facial 
expression (Figures 5-6).
Figure 5. The man finds he has been chased by himself.
Figure 6. “The other self” who has chased the man himself.
 Thus, Beckett as well as Godard makes eyes 
doubled in his work of film. Why?  It is because he 
tries not to make such different eyes unified in the 
perceiver's own perspective. If they are unified, the 
perspective would be a “ realist ” one in which the 
perceived object is reduced to the perceiver's subject. 
In Balázs's terms, the unification disturbs “polyphonic ” 
perspectives which should be presented in Film.
 Beckett originally had an intention of using film 
technology in order to realize such polyphony. The 
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script says: “Throughout first two parts all perception 
is E's. E is the camera. But in the third part there is O's 
perception of room and contents and at the same time 
E's continued perception of O. This poses a problem of 
images which I cannot solve without technical help ”
(11-12). In order to show in the film that E and O 
which seem to have different eyes are actually from the 
same man, he suggested as follows: “This difference of 
quality might perhaps be sought in different degrees 
of development, the passage from the one to the other 
being from greater to lesser and lesser to greater 
definition or luminosity ” (58).
 In this way, film has its own method of expressing 
the alter-ego type of scenes: the camera. Beckett 
positively attempted to make use of it in order to reach 
the “ essential reality, ” which can be paraphrased 
as “ affection image ” or is almost equated with “ the 
ultimate anguish of being perceived. ” In novels and 
plays, such thing can be expressed in their own ways, 
but Film dealt with it in a different form.
4. Facial Expression in Silent Film: Charlie Chaplin and 
Buster Keaton
To reach an anti-realist realm, or express an affection-
image, Beckett did two important things. One is to 
make the film silent. The other is to star a genius 
comedy actor. 
 Why was the film made silent? It is because words 
uttered by a character would conceal the “ essential 
reality ” or “ affection. ” Flight from perception would 
fail if words were uttered, because the function 
of words is to keep things in order from a certain 
perspective. In order to be free from the perception and 
reach the realm of “ essential reality, ” words can be a 
disturbance. Therefore, in the middle of the film, there 
is a scene in which one character prevents another 
from uttering his voice (Figures7-8). 
 Silence is closely related with Keaton's facial 
expression as the embodiment of the “ essential 
reality ” or “ affection. ” Here, we may refer to Ernst 
Cassirer's theory of myth and expression in The 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. He describes myth as a 
state of fluidity not being divided into subject, object, 
and other categories. In the mythical world, “ a reality 
is not “ actualized ” through the mediation of the 
phenomenon but is present in full actuality in the 
phenomenon” (68). 
 Such reality is, according to Cassirer, “ a vast 
diversity of original physiognomic characters. As a 
whole and in its parts the world still has a distinctive 
face, which may be apprehended at any moment as a 
totality and can never be dissolved into mere universal 
configurations, into geometrical and objective lines and 
shapes. ”
Figure 7. The gentleman with moustache is about to speak.
Figure 8. The lady stops the man uttering his voice.
What breaks and destroys this totality is language. 
Cassirer describes this as a move from “ the sphere of 
expression to that of representation. ”
 If we seek the origin of this breakdown, of this 
differentiation and articulation, we find ourselves 
led beyond the sphere of expression to that of 
representation, beyond the spiritual region in which 
myth is preeminently at home, into the region of 
language. Only in the medium of language do the 
infinite diversity, the surging multiformity of expressive 
experiences begin to be fixated; only in language do 
they take on “ name and shape. ” The proper name 
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of the god becomes the origin of the personal figure 
of the god; and through its mediation, through the 
representation of the personal god, the representation 
of man's own I, of his “ self ” is first found and secured. 
(77)
Cassirer's idea of myth accounts for Keaton's 
expression of “ essential reality ” from the perspective 
of symbolic theory. According to Cassirer, language 
organizes chaotic world of myth, by which the 
personality of god appears and his “ self ” or subject is 
established. 
 What Beckett made Keaton express in the last 
scene of Film can be considered as a chaos before this 
organizing process, which Cassirer called myth. That 
is why this film should be silent. The use of language 
makes it hard for the protagonist to reach the chaos, 
and if he speaks, then, his self is found. It is far from 
the “ essential reality ” in which subject - object 
relationship is dissolved.
 In this sense, starring a comedian / comedienne 
is effective, because their expression and body action 
are inclined to break up the cosmos, in which the 
perceiver and the perceived, or subject and object 
relationship is in order. Historically, the origin of 
such comic expression and action is considered to 
be in Italian commedia dell ’ arte. It made use of the 
masks on characters ’ faces and exaggerate their body 
movement, because they acted and became popular 
mainly in France, where their Italian language could 
not be conveyed to the audience. Beckett might have 
recognized this comedian's non-verbal function. In fact, 
in his plays, characters always fail in making logical 
and rhetorical sentences, and they are regarded as 
vaudevillians. 
 For Film, as is well known, it was expected that 
Charlie Chaplin would play the man fleeing from the 
camera. As a result, they could not cast him, but it was 
natural for them to ask for Chaplin because his origin 
was in silent films, and even in English music hall, 
although he appeared in talkie films in his late carreer. 
Balázs describes about Chaplin's being “ against the 
talkie ” before Modern Times. “Charlie had to be silent, 
for he was locked into his own grotesque mask, a mask 
which he had invented for himself and the success and 
popularity of which imprisoned him like an iron mask 
and would not let him go (238) ” . 
 Chaplin's mask cannot coexist with his voice. 
If Balázs's idea is true, it is clear that Chaplin is 
appropriate for playing the role of the man in Film.
 However, it might have been fortunate to fail 
in casting Chaplin, because Keaton's poker face is 
considered more appropriate to be “ against the 
talkie. ” *4 As is well known, Keaton hardly expresses 
his feeling on his face, while we often see Chaplin's 
mask reflecting his sentimentality and it sometimes 
takes the “ grotesque ” form, as Balázs pointed out. 
Feeling and sentimentality are the products of one's 
inner mind, so they are inclined to be subjective. The 
inclination to subject would prevent Film from reaching 
the realm of “ essential reality ” where subject-object 
relationship exists no longer. In this sense, Keaton's 
frozen expression seems to embody the realm better, 
and in Film, it actually does.
Conclusion
The “ alter-ego ” motif is often seen in both literature 
and cinema; the problem is how Beckett expressed 
such motif or what kind of mode or method he took 
to do so. As described above, he expressed the motif 
as embodying his idea of “ essential reality, ” which 
is contrary to an ordinary perspective of realism. In a 
realist worldview, the subject perceives, and the object 
is perceived. Such dichotomy must be denied to grab 
the “ essential reality. ” This is what Beckett tried to 
express in the mode of film, as he did in other works, 
too.
 The essential reality can be paraphrased as 
“ affection, ” which Bergson described as pain in a 
body. Gilles Deleuze extended this Bergson's idea to his 
film theory as an affection-image. The affection is not a 
subjective feeling or sentiment, but a state of jolting in 
one's body. 
 In Film, Bergson's pain is expressed as an anguish 
of being perceived. This anguish is not from an inner 
feeling. It is embodied in the main character's fleeing 
from the camera and their overlapped “ eye ” in the 
very last scene. 
 In order to present such image of affection, film 
has a unique method: close-up. In the last scene of 
Film, this technique is effectively used. Balázs sees the 
technique as a method of effacing the line between 
self and other, or subject and object; a close-up face 
expresses both. We cannot tell whether he/she is 
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perceiving or perceived. The close-up face is both the 
perceiving subject and the perceived object. Balázs 
calls this pluralist mode of expression as polyphonic.
 What is more, Beckett took another method of 
reaching the sphere of the “essential reality ” : making 
the film silent. As indicated in Cassirer's symbolic 
theory, language helps establish one's self, or subject. 
In that sense, a voice prevents the man from becoming 
“ non-being. ” That is why Beckett and his coworkers 
tried to cast an experienced comedian in silent film, 
such as Charlie Chaplin or Buster Keaton, who were 
both more skilled in controlling the face and body 
movement than in the use of language. 
 Thus, Beckett's idea of the “ essential reality ” is 
embodied with the help of close-up technique which is 
unique to film, and the comedian whose face is never 
influenced by any language or sentimental feeling, but 
just expresses the “affection. ” 
Notes
*1.  This paper is based on the oral presentation “On 
Film, ” delivered for the symposium “ Beckett 
and Media ” in IASIL Japan 24th International 
Conference at Kobe Shinwa Women's University, 
Oct 27th, 2007.
*2. It seems not coincident that Boris Kaufman, 
Vertov's brother, is the director of photography in 
Film. 
*3. The similarity between Beckett and Godard is 
analyzed in Deleuze's Cinema 2: The Time-Image.
*4. In this sense, Simon Critchley's phrase, “ sadness 
of aging face, ” is not appropriate for describing 
Keaton in Film.
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